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THE OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE DISABILITY ACT
FROM THE STANDPOI NT OF THE CLAIMANT
EDWARD J. SCHEUNEMANN
of the Denver Bar
The Colorado Occupational Disease Disability Act' at first
blush appears to be a humanitarian measure modeled after the
accident compensation acts and designed to spread the risks and
compensate the losses from diseases arising out of and in the
course of employment. A disabled workman seeking compensa-
tion for an industrial disease under the Act, however, is likely to
be thoroughly disillusioned the first time he consults a lawyer, for
he will learn that the Act is extremely limited in coverage, that
the burden of proof he must assume is virtually unbearable, and
that his rights are rigidly confined by harsh procedural provisions.
The Act has been in effect for slightly over five years. In that
period only an insignificant number of claims have been heard by
the Industrial Commission, an even fewer number have been com-
pensated, and the Colorado Supreme Court has not been called upon
to decide a single case arising under the Act.
Substantially all of the compensation acts covering accidents,
and a majority of the state laws covering occupational diseases,
provide for compensation for any accident or disease arising out
of and in the course of the employment whether the disability is
total or partial, temporary or permanent.2 The Colorado Occupa-
tional Disease Disability Act is restricted, however, in three im-
portant respects: First, not all diseases contracted as result of
employment are covered but only a specific list of 21 selected dis-
eases; Second, not all disabilities resulting from the selected dis-
eases are compensable but only total disability; and Third, even
total disability resulting from a covered disease is not compensable
unless the disability is of 30 days duration or longer-or, in the
case of silicosis and asbestosis-is total and permanent.
Although the Colorado Act is above average among those
listing specific diseases in the number listed, there are a number
of recognized and fairly common occupational diseases which are
not included such as anthrax, tularemia, various dermatoses, and
conditions arising from muscular fatigue or continued and re-
peated small trauma, sometimes called synovitis or tenosynositis.
4
A very significant omission is the failure to list any of the diseases
'COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 97, § 23 (1935).
2 United States Department of Labor, Bulletin No. 125.
'COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 97, § 456 and 458 (1935).
4 In some states this condition has been compensated as an accident since it Is
traumatic In origin, but the Colorado Industrial Commission has held that it does not
come within the Workmen's Compensation Act.
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which arise out of work with radioactive materials and irradiating
apparatus.5
New types of diseases resulting from occupational exposure
are constantly being recognized, and with the continual change
in materials used and working conditions in industry it is difficult
to see how any act which relies solely on a specific list of diseases
can provide effective coverage. The modern trend in such legis-
lation is clearly away from the listing of specific diseases and
toward general coverage under which any disease which can be
shown to have its origin in the employment is compensable. The
National Conferences on Labor Legislation and other represen-
tative groups, such as the International Association of Industrial
Accident Boards and Commissions, have repeatedly stressed the
importance of general coverage instead of coverage limited to
specified diseases.
7
ONLY TOTAL DISABILITY COMPENSABLE
Even though the disabled workman may have one of the
specific diseases listed in Section 9 of the Act, he may not be
entitled to compensation because only total disability is com-
pensable. Moreover, "disability" is defined in such a way in the
Act as to give rise to endless litigation as to its meaning. The
courts have customarily taken into consideration a claimant's abil-
ity to perform the work he was doing when he was injured and his
training and experience to do other kinds of work in measuring
disability under the Workmen's Compensation Act." It is at least
open to debate whether the courts could consider such factors in
determining whether there is total disability under the Occupa-
tional Disease Act, for Section 4 (b) defines "total disability" as
"the event of becoming physically incapacitated . . . from per-
forming any work for remuneration or profit." Taken literally, the
definition could be construed to mean that any man who is capable
of selling newspapers on a street corner or sitting at a desk can-
not be considered totally disabled.
From the standpoint of society there is far greater need for
effective compensation for partial disability than for total dis-
ability because it is so much more common. In the accident field
for instance, the 21st Report of the Colorado Industrial Commis-
sion reveals that there were ten times more cases of partial dis-
ability compensated during the period July 1, 1948 to June 30,
1950 than cases of total disability. Moreover, many occupational
diseases, such as silicosis and lead poisoning, frequently result in
The British Parliament in 1948 found the prevalence of these diseases sufficiently
important to justify a separate act, the Radioactive Substances Act, 11 & 12 Geo.,
VI, c. 37.
6 Note 2. Supra.
7 Acee, State Workmen's Compensation Legislation in 1947, MONTHLY LABOR RE-
VIEW. Oct. 1947.
8 Globe Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Commission, 67 Colo. 526, 186 Pac. 522 (1920).
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years of partial disability before the workman becomes totally
incapacitated. During those years he will find it impossible to
pass a medical examination for employment in practically any
large industry in Colorado. Frequently, his condition bars him
from any work for which he can qualify by training or expe-
rience-yet under the Colorado Act he is not entitled to any com-
pensation whatever for the loss of his livelihood. The Colorado
act in this respect too is more restrictive than those of a majority
of the states having occupational disease legislation.
Finally, even though the workman may be totally disabled
from a disease listed in the Act, he still may not be entitled to
compensation because the disability lasts less than 30 days or is
total for less than 30 days and then becomes partial.10 A work-
man under the Colorado Act who is totally disabled and
loses his entire earnings for 6 weeks would be entitled to a total
compensation award of $34.00. The amount involved hardy jus-
tifies the filing of a claim much less the tremendous expenditure of
time, expense, and effort necessary to make the proof required
under the Act in a contested case. Here again, in requiring such
an extreme "waiting period," Colorado is out of step with a major-
ity of the other states."
RIGOROUS REQUIREMENTS OF PROOF
Even in the extremely limited number of cases where the work-
man is totally disabled from one of the listed diseases and where
his total disability is of more than 30 days duration, he may
well find that he is denied compensation because he cannot meet
the rigorous requirements of proof set out in the Act.
He is required to prove that there is a direct causal con-
nection between the disease and the conditions under which his
work is performed; that the disease was a result of exposure-oc-
casioned by the nature of his employment and can be traced to
the employment as a proximate cause; and that the disease was
incidental to the character of the business and not independent
of the relation of employer and employee. These requirements
are not unusual and, in practice, amount to the requirement in
accident cases that the disability arise out of and in the course
of employment. However, the Occupational Disease Act adds a
specific additional requirement-that the claimant "establish each
and every fact by competent medical evidence.' 1 2 This restric-
tion of the type of proof to one particular kind of evidence seems
inconsistent with the humanitarian purposes for which compen-
sation acts are usually enacted.
Furthermore, he is required to prove that the disability re-
sulted within 120 days from the last "injurious exposure"-or in
'U. S. Department of Labor, Chart VI-Workinen's Compensation-Silicosis (1946).
"COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 97, § 456 (1935).
" Note 9, supra.
"CoLO. STAT. ANN., C. 97, § 451 (a) (1935).
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the case of silicosis and asbestosis-within 2 years."' This pro-
vision undoubtedly eliminates a large number of cases which
would otherwise be compensable. In cases of pulmonary fibrosis
produced by exposure to toxic materials, for instance, the disabil-
ity may not result until many months or even years after the
exposure which introduced the toxic materials into the lungs.
14
The same principle is true in cases of lead poisoning and benzol
poisoning which act slowly upon the blood supply, eventually
producing an anemia which is totally disabling and sometimes
fatal. 15 Similar unrealistic and unnecessary limitations are con-
tained in the act with respect to death claims. 16
This element of proof is further complicated by the defini-
tion of "injurious exposure" in Section 4 (g) of the Act as "that
concentration of toxic materials which would, independently of
any other cause whatsoever (including the previous physical con-
dition of the claimant) produce or cause the disease for which
claim is made." The definition is open to varying interpretations.
One of them is that a man with an inherent or acquired suscep-
tibility to certain toxic materials should be denied compensation
ufiless he can show that the concentration was sufficiently great
to have caused the disease in a man without such susceptibility.
Another is that compensation should be denied in every case unless
the claimant can show by scientific samples that there were suffi-
cient toxic materials present in his working atmosphere to satisfy
the so-called "standards of tolerance" established by expert medi-
cal testimony or published by such departments as the Department
of Labor with respect to specified materials.
PROOF OUT OF WORKMAN'S FINANCIAL REACH
This type of proof is utterly beyond the reach of the average
employee. In silicosis cases, for example, the proof necessary to
show a sufficient concentration of free silica in the atmosphere
requires the taking of dust samples from the air at the working
level by expert operators using complicated and expensive ma-
chinery for weeks and even months, and the analysis of such dust
samples to determine the number of dust particles per cubic foot
of air and the number of particles of free silica in the dust are
measured down to the fineness of twenty-five thousands of an inch
(1 micron) in size. 17 Not only does the average disabled work-
man lack the financial resources to make such extremely expensive
and complicated tests, but it is doubtful whether he has the legal
"3CoLo. STAT. ANN., c. 97, § 451, (c. and e.) (1935).
I' Sappington, Medico-Legal Phases of Occupational Diseases, p. 112 (1939).
'a See discussion of report by Dr. Paul Reznikoff in Discussion of Industrial Acci-
dents and Diseases, Bulletin 105, U. S. Dept. of Labor pp. 91-112. Sappington, op. cit.
n. 14.
"6CoLo. STAT. ANN., C. 97, § 452 (1935).
1 One of the standards of "allowable concentrations" suggested by the Department
of Labor for the guidance of employers in preventing silicosis, for instance, is 5,000,000
particles of free silica dust (under 10 microns in size) per cubic foot of air. Anthraco-




right to install such equipment and operators on his employer's
premises in order to do so. Even then, he lacks the necessary con-
trol over the materials and methods used in his employment to
make sure that the tests are truly representative of the conditions
under which he was exposed, and, of course, he doesn't even know
that such tests are necessary until after he has become totally dis-
abled and has left the working atmosphere.
Some courts have recognized the injustice of this requirement
of proof and have held that where the claimant shows that he is ex-
posed to a toxic material and produces medical evidence that he
is suffering from an occupational disease which results from such
exposure he has a prima facie case, and the burden of proof then
shifts to the employer to present evidence based on scientific tests
of the atmosphere.18 In simple cases where an employee has
worked only for one employer and in one job such a prima facie
case can be made because a medical expert can justifiably infer
that the employee was "injurisously exposed" when he knows
that the toxic material was present and that the employee has
the disease which he could not have contracted elsewhere. How-
ever, when the employee has worked for several different employ-
ers or in several different jobs for one employer it is often impos-
sible, on the basis of medical examination alone, to infer on con-
clude where the "last injurious exposure" occurred.
Other states have attacked the problem more directly by pro-
viding that any exposure to a toxic material is presumed to be
injurious unless the employer proves otherwise. 19 In the light of
the realities of occupational diseases, and in consideration of the
employer's possession and control of the proof, this would seem
to be a logical place for the burden of proof.
TIME LIMITATIONS ON FILING DISHEARTENING
Perhaps the most disheartening provision of all to the
disabled workman (and his attorney) is the limitation upon the
time for filing claims. Section 11 of the Act provides that com-
pensation is forever barred unless written claim is filed within
60 days after the date of disablement, br in the case of benzol
and its deritive, 90 days, or in the case of silicosis and asbestosis,
one year. -0 These limitations would seem to be reasonable enough
in the case of accidents where in the usual circumstances the
employee is immediately aware of the occurrence of the accident
and the resultant disability, and is on notice that he should do
something to obtain compensation. This is not true in many cases
11 Oldman Boiler Works v. McManigal, 58 F. Supp. 697 (N.Y. 1944); Harbison-
Walker Refractories v. lHarmon, 114 Ind. App. 144, 51 N.E. 2d 398 (1943); UTA-
Carbon Coal Co. v. Commission, 104 Utah 567, 140 P. 2d 649 (1943) ; Walter Bledsoe &
Co. v. Baker, 83 N.E. 2d 620 Ind. App. (1949).
191939 ARIz. CODE, 56-1213 (c) with respect to Silicosis; Laws of N. Y. '47 Supp.
p. 1166.
"CoLO. STAT. ANN., c. 97, § 453 (a) & (B) (1935).
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of occupational disease. It is a characteristic of many such dis-
eases that they are slow in onset and gradually cumulative in
effect. There is often nothing in the external circumstances to in-
dicate to the employee that he has incurred an occupational dis-
ease, and in many instances the disability is understandably at-
tributed to non-compensable conditions such as colds, rheuma-
tism, or arthritic. Moreover, even where the employee seeks med-
ical advice and treatment he may not discover that he has a disease
which is compensable until after the limitation for filing the claim
has expired, because it is also characteristic of many occupational
diseases that they are difficult to diagnose until after repeated
medical examination and treatment. 21 Miss Mary Donlon, Chair-
man of the New York Workmen's Compensation Board and presi-
dent of the International Association of Industrial Accident
Boards and Commissions, has expressed the problem as follows :22
Requirements for prompt claim filing which are fair enough in
accident cases, are often unsuitable or manifestly unfair in cases
where occupational disease develops slowly and where symptoms are
latent for such long periods that diagnosis relating disability to occu-
pational exposure often is made too late in the case history to permit
claimants to file their claims within a short claim filing period.
Some states have sought to solve this problem by basing the
limitation period on the "first distinct manifestation" of the dis-
ease; others use the first time upon which the employee knows
or has occasion to know that he is suffering a disability from an
occupational disease. 23 Both of these techniques, however, raise
difficult problems of proof. Perhaps the most satisfactory method
is that used in the Workmen's Compensation Act of Colorado where
specific limits are provided for the filing of claims but with dis-
cretion in the Industrial Commission to excuse late filings where
reasonable grounds exist and where the employer's rights are not
thereby prejudiced.
2 4
No ACT AT ALL MAY BE PREFERABLE
The Colorado Occupational Disease Disability Act is so limited
in coverage, so restrictive in application, and so harsh in its pro-
cedural provisions as to give rise to the possibility that a dis-
abled workman and society in general would be better off if the
Act was entirely repealed. At least before passage of the Act, the
workman had the possibility of a common-law remedy against his
employer. Under Section 8 of the Act, that remedy is now barred.
The language of that section is so sweeping as to abolish the em-
ployer's liability:
*' Sappington. op cit., Note 14, ch. V.
2 Note 15. supra.
" 1949 GEN. STATS. Of CONN., § 7442" 1949 Wisec. STATS., § 102.12.
4COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 97, § 363 (1935).
DICTA Vol. 28
February, 1951 DICTA 47
on account of any disease or injury to health, or on account of death
from any disease or injury to health, in any way contracted, sus-
tained or incurred by such employee in the course of or because of
or arising out of his employment, except only an injury compensable
as an injury by accident under the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act of Colorado.
Taken at face value this section purports to wipe out common
law liability even for diseases which are not compensable under
the Act. The net result of five years of operation of the Act ap-
pears to be complete protection to employers and their insurance
from any liability for occupational diseases whatever at the ex-
pense of the disabled workmen.
THE EXTENT TO WHICH TAFT-HARTLEY HAS
SUPERSEDED STATE LABOR LAWS
PHILIP HORNBEIN, JR.
of the Denver Bar
When Congress has "occupied a field," state legislation there-
in is precluded since "a concurrent power in two district sovereign-
ties to regulate the same thing involves ***** a moral and physical
impossibility."1 The Taft-Hartley law2 is a comprehensive measure
governing labor relations which affect interstate commerce. Many
states, including Colorado, now have labor relations laws of their
own, and the question of whether state or federal law is controlling
in a particular case is arising with increasing frequency.
There are three types of cases in which this problem may
occur: (1) representation cases-i. e. proceedings for the selec-
tion of a collective bargaining representative; (2) proceedings to
authorize the execution of a union-shop agreement; (3) actions,
either civil or criminal, growing out of statutory violations which
are termed "unfair labor practices."
Of course there is no problem presented in any case where
Taft-Hartley can definitely be ruled out of the picture because
interstate commerce is not "affected." '3 However, the nebulous
character of the concept of interstate commerce is well known
and the power of the National Labor Relations Board and other
federal agencies has, in recent years, been extended to activities
formerly considered to be purely intrastate in character.4 Still
the courts reiterate that there is a line beyond which the federal
'Passenger Cases 7 How. 283, 399 (1849) ; U. S. Constitution, Article VI.
-61 Stat. 136, 29 U. S. C. sec. 141 et seq. (1947).
3 The National Labor Relations Board can act only in cases "affecting commerce"
which is defined to mean "in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the
free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or
obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce.' Ibid. sec. 2(7).
4E.g. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); N.R.L.B. v. United Brotherhood
of Carpenters, 181 Fed. 2d 126 (6th Cir. 1950). Cf. Groneman v. International Brother-
hood of Electrical workers, 177 Fed. 2d 995 (10th Cir. 1949).
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government cannot go,5 and it must be presumed that there still is
such a thing as a purely local enterprise, immune from federal
control under the guise of the commerce power.6 In any event, the
marker delineating state and federal power can only be determined
in a case by case test,7 and any attempt to formulate general prin-
ciples on this point would be futile.
Assuming that in a particular case commerce is affected with-
in the meaning of Sec. 2(7) of Taft-Hartley, the question then
presented is whether any of the Act's substantive provisions are
applicable. According to recent Supreme Court decisions, the Taft-
Hartley Act belongs to that type of legislation which "completely
occupies the field" and renders inoperative state laws in cases
where the Act's provisions are applicable.
8
REPRESENTATION CASES
Since the passage of the Wagner Act" employees have had the
right to choose their collective bargaining representatives in elec-
tions conducted by the National Labor Relations Board. An em-
ployer is legally obligated to bargain in good faith with the repre-
sentative so chosen. 10 Many states have set up election machinery
of their own for the selection of bargaining representatives by
employees, and a number of cases have resulted concerning the
power of state agencies to act in cases where interstate commerce
is affected.
In the Bethlehem Steel case" the Supreme Court made it clear
that in any case in which the National Board has jurisdiction to
conduct a representation election, action by a state agency is fore-
closed even though the National Board, for reasons of volic, de-
clines to exercise its jurisdiction. Under the Wagner Act, which
was then in effect, supervisory employees were not excluded from
the National Board's jurisdiction, 12 but the Board, as a matter of
policy, declined to conduct elections among foremen.' 3 The New
York Labor Relations Board assumed jurisdiction over them and
conducted elections and made certifications of bargaining represen-
tatives. These proceedings of the New York Board were held by the
-Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. N.L.R.B.. 303 U.S. 453, 466, 467 (1938) ; Polish
National Alliance v. N.LR.B., 322 U. S. 643, 652, 653 (1944); 10 East 40th Street
Bldg. v. Callus, 325 U. S. 578, 584 (1945).
, But note the assertion of the former General Counsel of the National Board be-
fore a Congressional Committee: "The present thought of the Board * * * is that it
is a rare case in which business does not affect commerce in some degree, and that
where commerce Is affected, the Board has jurisdiction". (Twelfth Intermnediate Rie-
port of the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, May 26, 1948,
page 2). At the same hearing the following collotuy took place between the chairman
of the Committee and the General Counsel: "The Chairman: Well, there is no busi-
ness, then, that you would not have jurisdiction over?" "Mr. Denham: I can conceive
of very few businesses over which there is not at least technical jurisdiction." (Ibid.
page 3).
'10 East 40th Street Bldg. v. Callus, supra, n. 5.
With the exception of state laws concerning union-shop agreements, infra.
'49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. 151 (1935).
"°Supra, note 2, Sec. 8(a) (5).
1330 U. S. 767 (1946).
11Packard Motor Car Co. v. NT.L.R.B., 3130 U.S. 485 (1946).
18Maryland Drydock Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 733.
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Supreme Court to be of no force or effect because they encroached
upon the power of the National Board.1
4
The same result was reached in a case arising under the Wis-
consin Employment Peace Act, in which the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the rule of the Bethlehem Steel case, and held it equally
applicable under the Taft-Hartley law. " The Wisconsin Supreme
Court had held that the state Board could exercise jurisdiction
until and unless the National Board acted in the matter, 10 but the
U. S. Supreme Court "thought the situation too fraught with po-
tential conflict to permit the intrusion of the state agency, even
though the National Board had not acted ***I' The effect of these
decisions is to leave a vacuum in the area in which the National
Board has jurisdiction, but declines to exercise it. i" Congress at-
tempted to fill this gap by providing that the National Board can
cede jurisdiction to a state agency in certain cases "unless the pro-
vision of the state or territorial statute applicable to the determi-
nation of such cases by such agency is inconsistent with the corre-
sponding provision of this subchapter or has received a construc-
tion inconsistent therewith." 19 In practice this requirement has
made it almost impossible for the Board to cede any of its power
to state agencies since there is almost certain to be some divergence
between the provisions of state and federal statutes, either as
written or as construed.
2 0
CASES INVOLVING UNION SHOP CONTRACTS
This group includes all cases concerning contracts in any form
which require union membership, and which will be referred to
loosely as union-shop contracts. Taft-Hartley and some state laws
require that any contract between an employer and a union which
makes union membership compulsory must be ratified by a certain
percentage of the employees covered. The federal Act requires
approval by "a majority of the employees eligible to vote." 21 Colo-
rado requires that "three-quarters or more of (an employer's) em-
ployees shall have voted affirmatively" in favor of such agree-
ment. 22 Wisconsin requires approval by two-thirds of the employees
actually voting.
23
The Wagner Act contained a specific provision permitting an
employer to execute a union-shop contract with the union which
represented his employees.2 4 There was always some doubt as to
1 Supra, note 11.
,La Crosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S.
18 (1948).
"251 Wis. 583; 40 N.W. 2d 241 (1947).
"336 U.S. 25 (1948).
Th Senate Report No. 105, 80th Congress, April 17, 1947, page 26.
"Supra, note 2, Sec. 10(a).
"We have explored the possibilities of such agreements with several of the state
boards, but thus far we have not concluded any agreements because there are too many
instances where the state statute and the Federal statute are inconsistent." Speech of
N.L.R.B. Associate General Counsel, N.L.R.B. Release R-48, March 10, 1948.
2"Supra, note 2, Sec. 8(a) (3).
-' 1943 Colo. Sessions Laws, Ch. 131, Sec. 6(c).
-'Chapter 424, L. 1945.
-'Supra, note 9, sec. 8 (3).
whether this provision of the Wagner Act foreclosed the states
from outlawing such contracts.2 5 With the passage of Taft-Hart-
ley, however, Congress specifically provided in Section 14(b) that
state statutes prohibiting this type of agreement were not super-
seded by the provisions of Taft-Hartley. The National Board held
that this section did not apply to the Colorado and Wisconsin stat-
utes since they do not completely prohibit union-shop agreements,
but only require approval of such agreements by a certain propor-
tion of the employees. 26 But the Supreme Court held to the con-
trary in a case arising under the Wisconsin statute.27 The Court
construed the language of Sec. 14(b) of Taft-Hartley to protect
state laws which regulate the execution of union-shop agreements
as well as those which completely prohibit them.
Confronted with this decision, the National Board ruled that
even though state requirements for approval of union-shop con-
tracts are not superseded by Taft-Hartley, neither is Taft-Hartley
superseded by state law, and, therefore, the concurrent application
of both federal and state law is required.' 8 The practical effect of
these decisions in Colorado is something like this: In an election
for the approval of a union-shop agreement, a majority of all
eligible employees may vote in favor of such agreement, but this
may be less than three-fourths of the employees actually voting,
in which case the contract would be legal under Taft-Hartley, but
illegal under the Colorado Act. In another case, three-fourths of
the employees actually voting might vote affirmatively, but might
not constitute a majority of all employees eligible to vote, in which
case the contract would be legal under Colorado law -9 but not
under Taft-Hartley.
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CASES
The conflict between state and federal law is equally serious
in unfair labor practice cases. Under Taft-Hartley only the Na-
tional Board can issue a cease and desist order and petition the
courts for injunctive relief.30 Many state laws, including that of
Colorado, give a private party the right to equitable relief and also
damages against a party guilty of unfair labor practice. The ques-
tion of whether federal or state law controls is thus of great prac-
tical importance. If the conduct complained of is either protected
by the federal Act, or prohibited by it, the case is removed from
the operation of the state law, because, "When Congress has taken
the particular subject matter in hand, coincidence is as ineffective
3 In 1949 the Supreme Court held that Sec. 8(4) of the Wagner Act-no longer
in effect-did not affect the power of the states to outlaw or regulate union-shop con-
tracts. Infra, Note 27.
2:6 Northland Greyhound Lines, 80 N.L.R.B. 288.
2, Algona Plywood Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 301
(1949).
2 Western Electric Co., 84 N.L.R.B., No. 111.
2 The Industrial Commission has ruled that the Labor Peace Act requires approval
by three-fourth of the employees actually voting, rather than three-fourth of all em-
ployees eligible to vote. (Resolution adopted July 13, 1949).
N Amazon Cotton Mill v. Textile Workers of America, 167 Fed. 2d 183 (1948).
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as opposition, and a state law is not to be declared a help because
it attempts to go farther than Congress has seen fit to go."
'31
Sec. 7 of the federal Act provides in general terms that em-
ployees shall have the right to self-organization, collective bargain-
ing, and the right to refrain from such activity. Since the lan-
guage of Sec. 7 is general, it is not always easy to determine wheth-
er a particular state law runs counter to its provisions. A Florida
statute required union business agents to be licensed by a state
board, and required unions to file certain reports and pay an an-
nual fee of one dollar. The Supreme Court held both provisions
invalid because they were in conflict with the provisions of the
then-existing Wagner Act, the purpose of which was "to encourage
collective bargaining, and to protect the full freedom of workers
in the selection of bargaining representatives * * * * "" The Court
held that the "full freedom" of employees to self-organization and
collective bargaining was impaired by the Florida law which creat-
ed an "obstacle to collective bargaining" inconsistent with the fed-
eral Act. ":' Sec. 7 of Taft-Hartley purportedly protects the rights
of employees "to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing," and it must therefore be presumed that the
same result would be reached under the present law.
In an earlier case, 34 it was contended that a Texas statute re-
quiring union organizers to obtain an "organizer's card" from the
Secretary of State conflicted with the provisions of the Wagner
Act. The statute was invalidated on the grounds that it violated
the First Amendment, but the opinion stated that a majoriy of
the court did not agree that it conflicted with the provisions of
he Wagner Act. 35 Presumably the distinction which the Court
made between the Texas and Florida statutes was that the issuance
of a license in Florida was discretionary with the state board, but
in Texas the applicant was entitled to an "organizer's card" as a
matter of right.
BALANCING THE POLICE POWER v. FEDERAL LAW
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the states still may
exercise their police power in a labor dispute to prevent violence
and disorder. The Court held that the Wagner Act did not protect
"mass picketing, threats, or violence," 36 and that, therefore a
restraining order, issued under the Wisconsion Employment Peace
Act,3 7 which enjoined such conduct, did not deprive the defendants
of their rights under the Wagner Act. The Court held that an "in-
tention of Congress to exclude states from exerting their police
31 Justice Holmes in Charleston & WV.C.R. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S,
597, 604 (1911).
'Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 541 (1944).
":325 U.S. 543 (1944).
a Thomas v. Collins, 323 L.S. 516 (194A).
323 U.S. 542 (1944).
a Allen-Bradley Local Union %*. Wisconsin Employment lelations Board, 315 U.S.
740 (1941).
31 Ch. 57, Laws of 1939.
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power must be clearly manifested, ' 3 8 and that the federal Act is
plainly not "a mere police court measure.
'39
In a later case,40 also arising under the Wisconsin statute,
the Court held that the police power of the states in labor disputes
is not confined to cases of physical violence or breaches of the
peace. The union in that case had engaged in a novel form of strike
activity in which "the stratgem consisted of calling repeated spe-
cial meetings of the Union during working hours at any time the
Union saw fit, which the employees would leave work to attend.
It was an essential part of the plan that this should be without
warning to the employer or notice as to when or whether the em-
ployees would return."41 The defendant union contended that the
intermittent work stoppages constituted "concerted activity for the
purpose of collective bargaining" and were therefore protected by
Sec. 7 of the federal Act and immune from state legislation. The
Court held to the contrary. Although several pages of the decision
were devoted to this point, its rationale is obscure, at least to this
writer. The Court holds that the conduct of the union was not
"concerted activity" within the meaning of Sec. 7. However, it
appears that the intermittent work stoppages were part of a dis-
pute concerning the terms of a new collective bargaining agree-
ment, the old one having expired. 42 Admittedly the workers could
have engaged in an all-out strike which would have been protected
by Sec. 7. It is therefore difficult to understand the basis of the
Court's distinction between "concerted activities" which are pro-
tected by Sec. 7, and those which are not. There is nothing in the
Court's decision which is of any help in determining in future
cases whether particular types of union activity are protected or
unprotected by Sec. 7. The Court seems to take the the view that
in order to come under the protection of Sec. 7 workers must con-
fine themselves to orthodox types of "concerted activities." But
the mere fact that conduct is novel does not mean that it is
malum.43
ARE NEW STRIKE WEAPONS PROHIBITED?
It would not seem that the fact that the strike in this case
was unique in its nature would of. itself remove it from the pro-
tection of Sec. 7. If this is the rule which the Court means to adopt,
then labor unions will be unable to evolve new methods and tech-
niques in industrial disputes, although there is no inhibition on
the ingenuity of employers in their efforts to devise new ways of
resisting the demands of their workers.
Until the decision of the Supreme Court in the Plankinton
-315 U.S. 749 (1941).
"315 U.S. 748 (1941).
Si0International Union v. Visconsin ];nll)uvnient Izelations Board, 336 U.S. 2A5
(1948).
4 336 U.S. 249 (1948).
4 Ibid.
4 Cf. dissenting opinion, 336 U.S. 265 (1948).
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Packing Company case44 on February 13, 1950, there was no con-
trolling decision in a case where the conduct sought to be enjoined
under state law was also prescribed by Taft-Hartley. The Supreme
Court decisions already referred to indicate that under the gen-
eral principles of supersedure of state law by federal law, state
action would be foreclosed relative to any conduct over which the
National Board is given jurisdiction. The Court had already held
that state labor tribunals could not conduct representation elec-
tions among employees subject to the federal Act, and that state
laws could not destroy or impair rights granted to employees by
federal law. Still to be decided was whether a state court could
enjoin conduct which was prohibited not only by state law but by
Taft-Hartley as well. In a six-line memorandum opinion, the
United States Supreme Court held in effect that a state tribunal
has no power to enjoin acts which constitute unfair labor practices
under Taft-Hartley, even though such acts are also proscribed by
state law. 45 The decision contains no discussion of the problems
presented, but simply reverses the decision of the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court with reference to the Bethlehem Steel"6 and LaCrosse
Telephone, 7 cases. The Court apparently considered the principle
of the supremacy of federal law and its proper application so well
settled that discussion was unnecessary.
CASES UPHOLDING FEDERAL LAW
The important effect of this decision on the whole problem of
supersedure of state labor laws by the federal Act justifies a
recitation of the facts as gleaned from the decision of the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court.48 The complaining party, Stokes, was a former
employee of the Plankinton Packing Company which was ad-
mittedly engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of
Taft-Hartley. Stokes charged that he was discharged by the com-
pany because he was not a member of the C. I. 0. Packing House
Workers Union, and that his discharge was therefore in violation
of the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act.49 He further alleged that
his discharge had been brought about by the conduct of the C. I. 0.
union through acts of coercion and intimidation and that both the
union and the company were in violation of the Wisconsin Act.
The Wisconsin Board found in favor of the complaining party and
ordered his re-employment, together with compensation for the
wages which he had lost. The decision of the Board was upheld
and enforced by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The basis of the
United States Supreme Court's reversal was undoubtedly the fact
that the acts of the defendants, which the Wisconsin court found
to be inviolation of the Wisconsin statute, also constituted viola-
9 Plankinton Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 338 U.S.
953 (1950).
0 Ibid.
4 Supra, note 11.
47 Supra, note 15.
"225 Wis. 285, 38 N.W. 2d 688 (1949).
49 Supra, note 37.
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tions of Taft-Hartley, 0 and state law was therefore inapplicable
to the case.
The latest decision of the Supreme Court on the point under
consideration involved the Michigan Labor Mediation Law 5 which
forbids strikes unless approved by majority vote of the employees
in an election conducted by the state Mediation Board. Criminal
sanctions are provided for violation of the statutory provisions.
The C. I. 0. Auto Workers went on strike against the Chrysler
Corporation without complying with the statutory procedure, and
brought suit to enjoin criminal prosecution. The Supreme Court
held the Michigan law was invalid because it was in conflict with
the federal Act.5 2 The Court held that since Congress has legis-
lated concerning strikes affecting interstate commerce, state action
is not permissible. "Congress occupied this field and closed it to
state regulation.
'53
The decisions reviewed indicate the extent to which state labor
legislation has been superseded by Taft-Hartley. They also point
to the increasing number of problems arising as a result of the
overlapping of the two sets of labor laws. It is almost impossible
to predict with any certainty in a given case whether state or
federal law will finally prevail. The line of demarcation between
state and federal law can only be worked out in a case by case test.
A certain amount of uncertainty is inevitable in any field in which
both Congress and the states attempt to legislate concerning the
same subject matter. However, it is submitted that there is much
unnecessary conflict in the present labor legislation which could be
eliminated by appropriate action by Congress and state legisla-
tures.
"Supra, note 2, Sec. 8(a) (3), 8(b) (2).
5, 1948 Mich. Comp. Laws, sec. 423.1 et. seq.
52 International Union v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950).
5'339 U.S. 457 (1950).
NEW TRADE-MARK LAW PROPOSED
In collaboration with the Office of the Secretary of
State, the Patent Section of the Colorado Bar Association
has undertaken a revision of the Colorado laws relating to
trade-marks which is to be offered to the 38th General
Assembly. The basis for the revision of the Colorado law
is the proposed uniform state trade-mark law presented
to the recent conference in San Francisco of the National
Association of Secretaries of State. This latter law follows
rather closely the Federal act (Public Law 489, 79th Con-
gress, Chapter 549, approved July 5, 1946; Title 15, Chapter
22, U. S. Code). The principal difference between the pro-
posed uniform state trade-mark law and the trade-mark
law proposed for Colorado lies in the place of application
of the tests for registrability.
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FORFEITURE OF REINSTATEMENT RIGHTS BY
MISCONDUCT UNDER TAFT-HARTLEY
LINDSAY P. WALDEN
of the Denver Bar, General Counsel for Oil Workers International Union, CIO
This discussion is prepared with primary emphasis upon what
happens at operating level with respect to the question of forfeit-
ing rights to reinstatement because of misconduct on the picket
line and what constitutes misconduct. The attitude of the General
Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, when complaints
are sought in discharge cases and the judgment of the Labor Board
when such complaints come up for hearing have become of great
practical importance. From the operating level point of view, the
Board's decisional policies are secondary if the views of the Board's
General Counsel are contrary to those of the Board, because under
the Taft-Hartley Act 1 the General Counsel has final authority to
determine which complaints shall be heard by the Board by merely
refusing to issue the complaint. Under the Wagner Act this con-
flict did not exist, as the charging party had the right to appeal
to the Board itself should the Board's attorney refuse to issue the
complaint.
The question of forfeiting rights to reinstatement because of
misconduct on the picket line arises, under the present status of
the law, because of the proviso in Section 10 (c) of the Act, which
reads as follows:
No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any
individual as an employee who has been suspended or discharged
for cause. (Italics added).
This section 10(c) proviso was not in the Wagner Act, but
the Board and the courts in administering that Act did deny relief
to strikers and pickets who were found guilty of misconduct under
certain circumstances. However, those decisions are not here em-
phasized as this discussion is directed toward present status of the
law governing picketing. Actually, the misconduct here discussed
is not limited to picketing, as all misconduct activities in connec-
tion with a strike fall within the same legal principles whether it
be related to picketing or other associated strike activities.
Section 7 of the Act gives the employees the right to engage
in picketing activities, and Sections (8)a (1) and 8(a) (3) of the
Act attempt to protect the employees in the exercise of picketing
activities, but the protection is forfeited by the proviso of Section
10(c) if the employee is suspended or discharged for cause. The
problem then arises as to what misconduct on the part of the em-
'Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, Act of June 2.3, 1947, c. 120. 61 Stat. 136.
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ployee forfeits this protection for cause if the employer elects to
suspend or discharge the employee.
In the Standard Oil Company of California case,2 decided
October 13, 1950, the Board held, as a matter of law, that if, in
fact, the employees were not guilty of the forbidden picketing con-
duct then the employer has no valid defense for refusing to rein-
state them to their former jobs, even though the employer in good
faith believed they were guilty of misconduct. This same rule of
law was announced by the Board in Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp.
case3 which grew out of the alleged seizure via a sit-down strike of
the company's refinery by the strikers. This doctrine was also
applied by the Board in the Perfect Circle case4 to a situation in
which the employer urged that its plant manager reasonably be-
lieved that striking employees as pickets barred his entry to the
plant under threat of violence. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit, in NLRB v. Clinchfield Coal Corp.5 sus-
tained the Board in holding, upon conflicting evidence, that three
strikers, whom the employer believed engaged in misconduct, did
not, as a matter of fact, engage in such conduct, and, consequently,
that the employer did not have good cause for discharging the
strikers.
SUMMARY OF PRESENT STATUS OF LAW
Possibly, the best summary of the present status of the law
on this subject is stated by the Board in theStandard Oil of Cali-
fornia case6 , wherein it held:
The function of determining whether the striker's conduct is
lawful or unlawful has been entrusted by the Congress to the Board,
subject to judicial review, and not to any private agency. Thus an
employer, who discharges a striker on the ground that he has engaged
in unlaw strike activities, does so at the peril of deciding wrongly.
(Italics added).
In the above case, the employer filed a motion asking the
Board to take judicial notice of certain proceedings on the ground
that a California state court had found 24 of the discharged em-
ployees guilty of violating an injunction restraining mass picket-
ing and acts of violence in connection with the strike. With re-
spect to this motion, the Board stated:
This Board is not bound by determinations of a State Court in a
proceeding to which the Board is not a party; and, so far as appears,
the California Court did not make specific findings of fact as to the
alleged misconduct of the strikers. Under these circumstances, we
must rest our findings upon the evidence in the record before us.
In the same case, the Board further held that, "misconduct
2 91 N.L.R.B. 87 (1950).
354 N.L.R.B. 912 (1944).
470 N.L.R.B. 526 (1946) ; reversed on other grounds in 162 F. 2d 566 (1947).




is an affirmative defense" and that the burden of proof is upon
the employer who alleges that the discharge was made because of
the striker's alleged misconduct, and that the discharge of strikers
or pickets, "may be viewed . .. as having been made because of
lawful strike activity, unless the employer affirmatively proves
employee misconduct."
The academic law, at the present, concerning the effect which
unlaWful picketing or strike activities have upon rights of em-
ployees under the Taft-Hartley Act appears to be: First, Strikers
and pickets are presumed to have engaged in lawful and protected
conduct and are entitled to reinstatement upon abandonment of
the strike. Second, The burden of proof is upon the employer to
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that each discharged
or disciplined employee engaged in unprotected misconduct. Third,
The National Labor Relations Board, subject to judicial review, is
the sole judge as to whether strikes or pickets engaged in unlawful
conduct and as to what activities constitute misconduct.
In determining misconduct, the Board will not accept the em-
ployer's conclusion, which was based upon hearsay or rumor, con-
sisting of written and unwritten statements received by the em-
ployer from non-strikers and supervisors who failed to testifJ
directly in the proceedings before the Board.
7
Undoubtedly, there are many more activities and circum-
stances constituting misconduct which lawfully justfy loss of em-
ployee status than have been determined to date. Space will not
permit a complete discussion of all prior decisions on this subject.
ACTIVITIES CONSTITUTING MISCONDUCT
Some of the activties found by either the Board or the courts
to constitute misconduct are: physically blocking the entrance and
preventing operation of a mine ;" striking employees physically at-
tacking another employee who had returned to work while strike
continued;9 employees striking to compel an employer to violate a
law (Federal Stabilization Act of 1942) ;1o participating in strike
in violation of no-strike clause of valid contract ;11 pickets prevent-
ing plant manager from entering property by use of words and acts
which justified manager in believing that he could not get posses-
sion except through a fight and bloodshed;12 participating in a
strike to require an employer to recognize one union when another
union has been certified by the board ;13 picket threatening other
employees with physical violence and participating in mass picket-
ing of plant entrance, spitting on the general manager, and openly
advocating use of force and violence as an instrument of collective
?Ohio Associated Telephone Company, 91 N.L.R.B. 162 (1950).
'N.L.R.B. v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 145 F. 2d 66 (1944).
-Decatur Newspapers, Inc., 16 N.L.R.B. 489 (1939).
American News Co., Inc., 55 N.L.R.B. 1302 (1944).
Copperxweld Steel Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 18 (1947).
-N.L.R.B. v. Perfect Circle Co., 162 F. 2d 556 (1947).
'Thompson Products, Inc., 72 N.L.R.B. 886 (1947).
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bargaining and as a strike weapon. 14 In the latter case, the Board
stated that the picketing by from 75 to 100 strikers at the plant
entrance "had the effect of barring supervisory and other em-
ployees from the plant," and .that the picket whose reinstatement
was in question "personally participated in such mass picketing."
Similarly, in the Roanoke Public Warehouse case, 15 an employee-
picket was barred from reinstatement after wielding a heavy belt
on the picket line which resulted in his conviction of six separate
charges of assault, three of which were against fellow non-strik-
ing employees.
MASS DEMONSTRATIONS HELD MISCONDUCT
Participating in the seizure and retention of the employer's
plant by means of a sit-down strike is misconduct under the Fan-
steel decision of the Supreme Court,16 and this is true despite the
union's contention that employees seized control in order to shut
down dangerous operations safely when the strike was called.' 7
Likewise, participating during a strike in a mass demonstration
which amounted to a forcible debarment of persons lawfully en-
titled to enter a plant has been held to be misconduct forfeiting
reinstatement rights.18 However, in the Standard Oil Co. of Cali-
fornia case,' 9 the Board denied the company's contention that it
had "a right to discharge all those identified in the mob" which
gathered at the entrance because, in the language of the Board:
Unlike the situation in Socony Vacutm the strikers here did not
gather at the gates pursuant to any plan to obstruct entry to or from
the refinery, or any other illegal plan; and the record dicloses . ..
that many of these strikers . . . were merely observers who stood
apart from those who gathered directly in front of the Respondent's
gates.
With reference to pickets' hurling of obnoxious and offensive
epithets at non-strikers, such as "scabs" and "suckers", the Board
in the Wytheville Knitting Mills case 20 said:
Although we have not previously condoned the use of abusive
and intemperate language in the conduct of industrial relations, real-
ity requires us to recognize that industrial disputes are not always
conducted in the dispassionate atmosphere best calculated to result
in their amicable settlement. Viewed in this light, the language of
(the pickets) ... must be regarded as an integral and inseparable
part of their concerted activity for which the Act affords them
protection.
Apparently the Third Circuit Court of Appeals does not agree
with the Board as the case was reversed. The Court of Appeals
stated:
" Dearborn Glass Co.. 78 N.L.R.B. 891 (1948).
072 N.L.R.B. 1281 (1947).
N.L.R.B. N'. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
1Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 54 N.L.R.B. 912 (1944)
"Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 78 N.L.R.B. 1185 (1948).
'991 N.L.R.B. 87 (1950).
2"N.L.R.B. v. \vythe\ille Knitting Arills, 175 F. 2d 238 (1949).
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We do not regard the conduct . . . as a legitimate, concerted
activity entitled to the protection of the Act. When as a result of it,
each of them became persona non grata to their fellow workers to
such an extent that the latter absolutely declined to work with them
.. . the respondent was not required ... to reinstate them at the risk
of throwing the scaming department into confusion. (Italics added).
It is not clear whether the use of the words "scab" and "suck-
ers" standing alone would justify the discharges if fellow em-
ployees did not refuse to work with the pickets who used the words.
However, on October 12, 1950, a trial examiner in Tidewater
Associated Oil Company' held that a statement by a picket "that
anyone that went through a picket line was a dirty rotten scab"
merely followed a custom that has existed for many years in labor
disputes, and recommended that the discharged employee be rein-
stated. Therefore, it appears somewhat doubtful whether pickets
may use the word "scab" toward non-strikers and still receive pro-
tection of the Act. The answer to this question must necessarily
depend upon subsequent decisions.
Five employees who engaged in a concerted slow-down follow-
ing a wage reduction were held guilty of misconduct sufficient to
warrant their discharge in the Elk Lumber Co. case.2 2 Cutting off
the power from the boiler stoker preparatory to going on strike
was deemed misconduct in the River Falls Co-operative Creamery
case,-3 especially since this was neither the normal act of a fireman
about to leave his post nor a necessary concomitant of his going
on strike.
UNION OFFICER HELD RESPONSIBLE
In another Tidewater Associated Oil Co. case,24 the trial ex-
aminer held that a union officer who was present and witnessed
the assault and manhandling of non-strikers "without making an
effort to halt the attack" was guilty of misconduct. It is interesting
to note here, however, with respect to another discharge, that the
trial examiner held:
Assuming, arguendo, that Fonseca had in fact thrown the pebbles
or gravel or small rocks testified to by McLaughlin and Jessee as
having occurred on September 29, such conduct could not warrant his
exclusion from an order of reinstatement.
In support of the above finding, the trial examiner cited NLRB v.
Elkland Leather Co.2 5 wherein the U. S. Court of Appeals, Third
Circuit, had sustained the Board in its findings that the offenses
charged were not "of sufficient gravity to warrant exclusion from
the order of reinstatement." Certiorari was denied by the U. S.
Supreme Court. With respect to the trial examiner's ruling, it is
well to point out that the circuit court decision relied upon arose
N.L.R.B. Case No. 20-CA-170 (19,H).
-91 N.L.R.B. 60 (1950).
2 90 N.L.R.B. 56 (1950).
- N.L.R.B. Case No. 21-CA-170 (1950).
114 F. 2d 221 (CA 3) (1940).
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under the Wagner Act rather than under the Taft-Hartley Act,
and consequently, may not be conclusive.
The oft-cited Standard Oil Co. of California case26 is quite
inclusive as to the subject of misconduct and appears to be the lat-
est decision by the NLRB on the subject. Fifty-six employees were
discharged for alleged misconduct, and the Board ordered forty-
three of them reinstated. The Board found the evidence insufficient
to establish that the latter had committed the alleged acts of mis-
conduct. The specific acts of misconduct which the Board found
as good cause for refusal to reinstate the thirteen pickets who were
denied protection under the act were: (a) Picking up a rock for
the sole purpose of throwing it at the police officers who were
escorting a non-striker in a squad car and for refusal to put down
the rock when ordered to do so by the police. (b) Smashing the
windows of cars which were entering the refinery gate. (c) Carry-
ing stones, together with other pickets, which prevented two non-
strikers from entering a parking lot prior to going to work.
(d) Struggling with police officers and interfering with police offi-
cers in their efforts to perform their duties. (e) Standing in front
of cars at the entrance to the parking lot and refusing to move
at the command of police, and pushing back the police officers
who were trying to remove him from in front of the cars. (f)
Beating up four non-strikers when attempting to enter the re-
finery premises. Grabbing a non-striker by the arm and pull-
ing him off company property when walking to work. (g)
Striking an employee of a construction contractor when going
to work at the same refinery to perform work for his construction
employer. (h) Stating to a female employee who was attempting
to cross the picket line, "You dirty little bitch, you are not going to
work."
APPLICATION OF LEGAL DEFINITION DIFFICULT
The Board also held that the employer may not refuse rein-
statement to a picket on the ground that the picket prevented the
passage of a railroad train to and from the refinery where the
picket's activity was that of walking back and forth across the
tracks rather than parallel to the tracks when the locomotive ap-
proached the picket line. It was held that the picket did not thus
physically block ingress or egress to the plant, and also that this
picket's statement that "he would lie down on the tracks rather
than permit passage of the train" was not sufficient attempt to
block the entry to the refinery and did not bar his reinstatement.
With respect to another picket, the Board held that his alleged mis-
conduct did not justify his discharge because rocks were thrown
at him by employees inside the plant, and this picket threw two
- 91 N.L.R.B. 87 (1950).
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stones back, "each a little bigger than the size of a penny" and the
small stones fell harmlessly. The Board further stated:
In our opinion, Ottino's conduct, under the circumstances here-
inabove set forth ... was not of such a serious nature as to pass the
limits of protected activity.
As can be seen by the cited authorities, the question of what
constitutes misconduct is somewhat vague and is still in the stage
of development. However, as a general guide, it is suggested that
the definition cited by the trial examiner in the Tidewater Asso-
ciated Oil Company case, citing Boynton Cab Co. vs. Neubeck, by
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 27 may be used. This reads as
follows:
* * * The term "Misconduct" used in (the disqualification provision)
is limited to conduct evincing such wilful or wanton disregard of an
employer's interest as is found in deliberate violations or disregard
of standards of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of
his employee, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree or re-
currence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil
design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the
employer's interest or of the employee's duties and obligations to his
employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory con-
duct, failure in good performance as a result of inability or incapacity,
inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances or good
faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed "miscon-
duct" within the meaning of the statute.
PICKETING- FREE SPEECH?
CHARLES A. GRAHAM
of the Denver Bar
The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in
Thornhill v. Alabama1 has given rise to extensive speculation as
to the legal status of picketing.
2
Language employed by the court has been quoted to support
the contention that picketing is a form of speech on a parity with
public debate for purposes of determining its constitutional im-
munity to regulation.3 The consequences, of course, would be that
picketing could be neither forbidden nor punished unless upon a
showing of a clear and present danger of extremely serious4 sub-
27296 N. W. 636 (1941).
310 U.S. 88 (1949).
'Adequate citation to the legal journals alone would require more than the space
allocated for this discussion. A few references will be provided below.
3 One of the most specific statements of this sort, made by the late Mr. Justice
Murphy, was: "In the circumstances of our times the dissemination of information
concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area of free
discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution." (Supra, n. 1 at 102).
4 "What finally emerges from the 'clear and present danger' cases is a working prin-
ciple that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high before utterances can be punished." Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252, 263 (1941).
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stones back, "each a little bigger than the size of a penny" and the
small stones fell harmlessly. The Board further stated:
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inabove set forth ... was not of such a serious nature as to pass the
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stantive evils arising "under circumstances affording no oppor-
tunity to test the merits of ideas by competition for acceptance
in the market of public opinion." 5
Subsequent dissenting opinions suggest that this free speech
theory of picketing did no injustice to those from whose opinions
the quotations were drawn.0 It was nonetheless subjected to dras-
tic curtailment in a series of decisions. 7 The culminating and pres-
ent position of the frequently divided Court," as formulated in
Hughes v. Superior Court,9 is that: "Picketing is not beyond the
control of a State if the manner' in which picketing is conducted
or the purpose which it seeks to effectuate gives ground for its dis-
allowance.""'
ALLOWABLE AREA OF ECONOMIC CONFLICT
As to the manner of conduct, picketing must be peaceful;"
though the occasional use of strong or insulting language and
"isolated incidents of abuse ' 12 or a "trivial rough incident or a
moment of animal exuberance" 13 does not suffice to remove its
constitutional protection. Picketing may be conducted by strangers
to the dispute without loss of its constitutional status14 and this is
so though the picketed employer may have no employees at all.' 5
Constitutional protection may be forfeited by pickets who seek
to conscript neutrals remote both in interest and in location from
5 Thornhill v. Alabama, supra, at 105. See Free Speech and Picketing for "Unlawful
Objectives", 16 Univ. Chi. L. REv. 701 (Note - 1949).
6 See, for example, the dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Black (Justices Douglas
and Murphy concurring) and Mr. Justices Reed in Carpenters and Joiners Union v.
Ritters Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942). See dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Minton (joined
by Justice Reed) in International Brotherhood v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 482 (1950) : "It
seems equally clear to me that peaceful picketing which is used properly as an instru-
ment of publicity has been held by this court in . . . (citing cases) to be protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment."
See Fraenkel, Peaceful Picketing-Constitutionally Protected?, 99 Univ. Pa. L.
Rev. I (1950) ; Armstrong, Where Are We Going with Picketing7, 36 CALIF. L. REV.
1 (1948) ; Picketing, Free Speech and the Unlaw Purpose Tests, 49 COL. L. REV. 711
(Note, 1949).
8 In the most controversial cases Mr. Justice Frankfurter commonly writes the
majority opinion of the "now" Court; Justices Vinson, Jackson, Burton and Clark con-
cur; Justices Black, Douglas, Reed and Minton dissent. Devotees of the broad theory
of "breakfast jurisprudence" may well speculate as to the impact on the sanctity of
picketing of certain recent changes in the personnel of the Court.
' 339 U.S. 460 (1950). As to the lower court decision, see Groves, Right of Negroes
to Picket for Proportional Hiring, 22 So. CAL. L. REV. 442 (Comment 1949) ; (Note) 62
HARv. L. REV. 1077 (1949).
i0 This is also the position generally taken by state courts even during the period
of seeming uncertainty in the decision of the United States Supreme Court. See Free
Speech and Picketing for "Unlawful Objectives," supra, n. 5; James v. Marinship Corp.,
25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P. 2d 329 (1944) ; Colonial Press v. Ellis, 321 Mass. 495, 74 N.E.
2d 1 (1947) ; Hotel and Restaurant Employees International Alliance v. Greenwood,
Ala ...... 30 So. 2d 696 (1947) ; Schwab v. Moving Picture Machine Operators Local
No. 159, 165 Ore. 602, 109 P. 2d 600 (1941) ; Wolferman, Inc. v. Root, 356 Mo. 976, 204
S.W. 2d 733 (1947) ; Swenson v. Seattle Central Trades Council, 27 Wash. 2d 193, 177
P. 2d 873 (1947) ; International Association of Machinists v. Downtown Employees
Association, Texas, Court of Civil Appeals, First District at Galveston. 13 Labor Cases,
Paragraph 64,053, 7/31/47.
" If it is "enmeshed in violence," all picketing, for the time being, may be forbidden.
Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmore Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
n2 Use of epithets such as "Unfair" or "Fascist" is protected, Cafeteria Employees
Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943).
1" Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmore Dairies, Inc., supra, n. 11..
" American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941).
"Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U. S. 293 (1943). (former employees
having become partners; a technique not unknown even in Colorado).
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the controversy'" or who follow employees from the job and picket
them in their homes. 1'7 It may not be declared forfeit, however,
simply because there is no labor dispute as defined in a state regu-
lation of industrial relations i8 or because picketing discourages
customers or reduces services of the employer. 19
Picketing also may lose its constitutional immunity to injunc-
tive relief if the purpose it seeks to effectuate is to compel a viola-
tion of state anti-trust laws, 20 a state labor relations act,2' or the
National Labor Relations Act.22 The illegality of the purpose may
likewise derive from judicial as compared with legislative policy.
2 '
Thus picketing "has an ingredient of communication ''2 4 that
may not be forbidden or punished except in conformity with the
strict limitations of the clear and present danger rule. Yet picketing
"cannot dogmatically be equated with the constitutionally protect-
ed freedom of speech"; it may be forbidden or punished provided
in conduct or objective it is found unlawful by legislative or ju-
dicial test not inconsistent with the "rooted traditions of a free
people." Picketing, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter so clearly stated
in the Hanke case, is "indeed a hybrid."
2
5
STATE DECISIONS NOT VERY HELPFUL
The Colorado decisions during the period under discussion
require brief comment. In Denver Local Union v. Perry Truck
Lines26 and Denver Local Union v. Buckingham Transportation
Co.2 7 the Colorado Supreme Court applied the rule that peaceful,
stranger picketing is entirely lawful. In Milk Producers v. Broth-
erhood2 8 the Court seems 29 to have sustained a restraining order
based upon unlawful manner of conduct and not precluded by the
Colorado Labor Peace Act.30 In Meat Cutters v. Greens , it would
appear that similar freedom from the inhibtions of that Act 32 en-
abled a restraint based upon illegality of objective.
3 3
" Carpenters and Joiners Union v. Ritters' Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942).
"TAllen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315
U.S. 740 (1942).
's Bakery & Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942). See Teller, Picketing and
Free Speech, 56 1ARV. L. REV. 180, 193 (1942).
19 Carlson v. California, 310 U. S. 106 (1940).
20 Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) ; (Note) 10 LA. L.
REV. 541 (1950); (Note) 62 -ARv. L. REV. 1402 (1949); Free Speech and Picketing
for "Unlawful Objectives", supra, n. 5.
2 Building Service Employees v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950); Wilbank v. Bar-
tenders Union, 360 Pa. 48, 60 A. 2d 21 (1948) ; cert. den. 336 U.S. 945 (1949).
22 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. National Labor Relations
Board, CCA-2, 1950) 181 F. 2d 34. See (Note) 45 ILL. L. REV. 408, 409 (1950).
21 Hughes v. Superior Court, supra, n. 9; International Brotherhood v. Hanke, 339
U.S. 470 (1950). See (Note) 3 VAND. L. REV. 313 (1950).
uInternational Brotherhood v. Hanke, supra, n. 23.
25 Idem, supra, n. 23. As W. S. Gilbert has so clearly stated : "Of this there is no
manner of doubt, no probable possible shadow of doubt, no possible doubt whatever"
(Gilbert and Sullivan, Gondoliers, Act I).
2 106 Colo. 25, 101 P. 2d 436 (1940).
27108 Colo. 419, 118 P. 2d 1088 (1941).
116 Colo. 389, 183 P. 2d 529 (1947).
-" 'Because of the inadequacy of the record we decline to decide the constitutional
issues involved." 334 U.S. 809 (1948 per curiam).
'COLO. STAT. ANN., (1935), c. 97, § 94.
31 119 Colo. 92, 200 P. 924 (1948).
Idem, supra, n. 30.
"2 The union seemingly demanded an agreement unlawfully forcing union member-
ship upon employees as in Building Service Employees v. Gazzam, supra, n. 21.
64 DICTA Vol. 28
Brotherhood v. Publix Cab Co., presents a set of kaleidoscopic
facets that, it is to be hoped, will not soon recur.', After a caution
as to limited applicability of its decision to other situations, 36 the
court concluded with reference to only a few of the conflicts and
ambiguities as follows: 1
Where, as in this case, the record shows the absence of any
negotiations having taken place, or a dispute having occurred, or a
statement of grievances having been submitted by the individuals
striking and picketing to the individuals against whom the strike has
been called and against whom the pickets are presumably picketing,
we say that it is against the public interest to allow such picketing
because a bona fide dispute has not been shown to exist.
The quest for certainty in this field is rewarding in neither
state nor national jurisdiction. Could it be that the legal problem
has a political aspect and thus will be solved more easily after a
few more Supreme Court vacancies are filled, or, perhaps, after
November 4, 1952?
AGUIDETO THE TRIAL OF AN EMPLOYEE SUIT
UNDER THE WAGE AND HOUR LAW
EDWARD H. SHERMAN
of the Denver Bar
This article has been prepared primarily to aid the general
practitioner who is called upon either to sue or defend a claim
arising out of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The busy practi-
tioner faced with an employee suit for these claims is bewildered
by the maze of statutory, judicial, and administrative rulings. He
has not had many occasions to delve into a new field of law which
in a short time has developed into a complexity of rules and de-
cisions which compare to that developed in other fields in over
a hundred years. This article does not presume to be a treatise
on the law. It does not claim to be exhaustive. It will deal with
substantive law only incidentally. The object is to point out cer-
tain common problems of procedure and practice which you will
probably face when you sue for an employee or defend his em-
ployer.
Let us assume that you represent the employee. He seeks to
recover minimum wages or overtime pay which his employer
21 119 Colo. 208,, 202 P. 2d 154 (194i).
s Two attempts at strike votes were "unsuccessful"; union collective bargaining
authorizations and revocations circulated like counterfeit bills; an unheralded strike
was called; the union officials said the strike was against the owner-drivers, but all
the strikers except one said it was against Publix Cab Co. ; no attempt had been made by
the union to negotiate with the owner-drivers against whom the officials said the strike
was called and whom the union at the same time purported to represent. Controversy
raged as to who represented whom, who was employed by whom and for what purpose,
and which statute if any was applicable.
so In which the writer respectfully joins.
S' Supra, n. 34 at 217.
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denied him and which he claims to be entitled to under the Act.
You have carefully examined the facts, and now you must decide
whether he is entitled to the minimum wage or overtime pay
benefits which the law provides. You carefully examine the sub-
stantive provisions of the FLSA, as amended,' and as affected by
the Portal-to-Portal Act.2 You now know generally that the client
is entitled to minimum wages and overtime pay as prescribed by
the law if he was engaged in interstate commerce, in production
for commerce, or in an occupation closely related and needed for
this production. You have learned that the present minimum rate
for employees within the scope of the Act is 75 cents an hour and
that the employer must pay for time worked in excess of 40 hours
weekly at a rate of 1!/2 times the regular rate. You realize that
the first and basic problem is whether the client is covered by the
Act. The particular activities of the client is the decisive ulti-
mate test. Here you cannot stop with the statute. You must con-
sider thousands of definitions and rulings which try to determine
coverage in various cases. You have further carefully examined
the exemptions from the Act which, under the amendments of
1949, have been redefined and greatly expanded. You will search
the administrative rulings on which many exemptions are based.
Let us now assume that you have determined that your employee
is covered by the Act and that his activities or those of his em-
ployer are not exempt. The next problem is to determine what
relief is available to the employee.
EMPLOYEE HAS CHOICE OF REMEDIES
Your employee will have a choice between three types of
suits, but he must choose between them. You may advise him that
he could waive his right to bring suit and make an agreement to
accept from the employer payments of the amount which is due
him under the supervision of the administrator of the Wage and
Hour Division. Under Section 16(c) of the amended Act, he may
consent to suit brought by the administrator on his behalf, but if
he does this he cannot bring a suit on the same claim, either in-
dividually or collectively. His other choices are an individual suit
in his own name or a collective suit brought by a fellow employee
for his benefit and other employees similarly situated. A final
judgment in any of these types of suits will obviously be a bar
to bringing another type of suit on the same cause of action, and
if the employee consents to suit by the administrator, he gives up
his right to liquidated damages and attorney's fees which he would
otherwise have in the other types of suits. The employee would
be wiser to sue in his own right under Section 16(b) or to join
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1,38 and Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949,
29 U.S.C. 201-219, as amended.
- Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. 251-263.
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with others in a collective action brought for the benefit of them-
selves and other employees similarly situated. The mere threat
of liquidated damages and attorney fees imposed, is alone a power-
ful weapon for an adjustment. Let us assume, therefore, that you
have decided to proceed by an individual suit or a collective one
for the employee. In the process of litigation you will surely face
many of the problems which are set out below.
PROPER PARTIES TO THE ACTION
Your employee is the real party in interest, and the action
should be maintained by him for and in behalf of himself or other
employees similarly situated and by other employees who have
joined him in a group action. The Portal-to-Portal Act, which
became effective May 14, 1947, prohibits an action by a non-em-
ployee representative. You can no longer designate a union or
other representative to maintain the action for the employee. The
Portal-to-Portal Act also prohibits assignment of "portal" wage
claims not compensable by contract, custom or practice which
arose prior to May 14, 1947. If it were not for this, it would seem
that an assignee would be a proper party3 . A person who is not
an employee cannot file a suit under Section 16 (b) as a representa-
tive or agent of an employee or on behalf of all employees similarly
situated; however, other employees may join your client in bring-
ing a collective suit. In order to become a party plaintiff to a
suit, the employee must give his consent in writing which must be
filed in the court where the action is brought. No time limit is set
forth within which the employee must file his written consent
(Sec. 7, Portal-to-Portal Act). The problem is somewhat analagous
to interventions in which employees similarly situated were al-
lowed to intervene where they desire to become parties to the
action. It is interesting to note that one court construed Section
16 (b) of the Act as providing a permissive joinder device whereby
employees with individual claims could present them simultane-
ously to avoid much litigation, a procedure which was not "a
true class suit."4 Employees similarly situated, who are not joined
as parties nor represented by employees who are parties to the
suit, have been held not to be bound by the judgments. Thus, you
may bring an action for your employee and all other employees
similarly situated and may join other employees whose claims may
be separate and distinct if they otherwise consent to become par-
ties to the action. The words "similarly situated" do not mean
identically situated nor do they limit the participants to the action
to those employees who are of the same class or department as the
plaintiff.' It is important that in collective suits the employee
3 Frisch v. Zelart Drug Co'., 46 N.Y.S. 2d 44 (1943).
SPentlan,! v. D)ravo Corp., 152 Fed. 2d 851 (3rd Cir. 1945).
6Shain v. Armour & Co., 40 F. Supp. 488 (D.C. Ky. 1941); McNichols V. Lenno,
Furnace Co., 7 F.R.D. 40 (D.C.N.Y.. 1947); Wright v. U.S. Rubber Co., 69 F. Supp.
621 (D.C. Iowa 1946).
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should give his consent in writing to become a party plaintiff and
file this consent in court.
THE PROPER FORUM FOR THE ACTION
Section 16(b) of the FLSA provides that an employee may
sue in any court of competent jurisdiction. This will permit you to
proceed in either a federal or a state court. Your choice of courts
will be based largely on matters of expediency or strategy. Under
the Act, the federal court will take jurisdiction regardless of
whether there is diversity of citizenship or whether the amount
exceeds $3000." You should note, however, that the jurisdiction
of the federal court may, in addition, be based upon other grounds.
Federal jurisdiction may thus exist because the cause is one which
exceeds $3,000 and is between citizens of different states, because
there is involved the enforcement of a penalty under the federal
laws, or because the law involved regulates interstate commerce.
You will understand the federal decisions better if you consider the
source of jurisdiction.7 So, for example, if the suit is for some-
thing other than minimum wages and overtime compensation and
not within the Act, a federal court may deny jurisdiction unless
it is shown that there is diversity of citizenship and the contro-
versy exceeds $3,000.8
There is no reason why our county court could not assume
jurisdiction if the amount does not exceed $2,000, but in estimating
the amount involved the court will include liquidated damages and
attorney's fees which are not considered costs, but are, in fact,
part of the allowable recovery. If the amount sought should be
beyond the court's jurisdiction, this would not oust the court but
would probably nullify the amount claimed beyond the jurisdictional
limitY Your most perplexing problems will concern the removal of
an action to the federal court after you have started it in the
county court. The decisions cannot be reconciled. It would seem
that since Congress provided that the action may be maintained in
any court of competent jurisdiction, it should be prosecuted to
final judgment in that court and not removed.1"
You will, of course, conduct the suit in accordance with the
rules of practice and procedure which are in effect in the court
where your action is brought. Where the procedural question is
not covered by the Act, you will follow the rules of the court. This
will be true on questions involving the capacity to sue, process,
aMaloy v. Friedman, 80 F. Supp. 290 (D.C. Ohio 1948) ; Robertson v. Argus Hos-
iery Mills, Inc., 121 Fed. 2d 285 (6th cir. 1941).
1 Federal jurisdiction may be based upon the amount of the controversy and diver-
sity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 41 (1) ; because you seek to enforce a penalty under
federal laws, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 371; or under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 41 (8) because the suit arises
under a law regulating commerce.
8See, for example: Schempf v. Armour & Co., 5 F.R.D. 294 (D.C. Minn. 1946)
Kantor v. Garchell, 150 Fed. 2d 47 (8th Cir. 1945).
'Caperna v. Williams-Bauer Corp., 9 Labor Cases, Sec. 62,607 (N.Y. 1945).
10Johnson v. Butler Bros., 162 F 2d 87 (C.C.A. Minn. 1947) ; Harris v. Reno Oil
Co., 48 F. Supp. 908 (D.C. Tex. 1943).
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venue, joinder of parties and causes of action, etc. Under the Act,
a union or one of its agents can no longer bring an action on be-
half of the employee. A minor will sue by his next friend. The
question of venue in the state court will be determined by our
Rule 98. You may have to determine whether the action is for
recovery of a penalty or on a contract, and the courts have differed
as to this matter. In the federal court the question would probably
be, determined by the rules and Section 51 of the Judicial Code
(28 USC Section 112). Our rules of procedure as to joinder of
parties and actions would seem to apply. Nevertheless, it should
be noted that under Section 16 (b) of the Act, the joinder of parties
and claims seems to be specifically provided for on the basis that
the employees are all similarly situated and the causes arise out
of the same set of circumstances. The federal courts have indi-
cated a very liberal attitude in permitting joinder of parties and
causes of action in one suit, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 16 of the Act.11
PLEADING REQUIRES JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS
How shall you draft your complaint in this type of action?
For the most part, the sufficiency of the complaint will be deter-
mined by the appropriate Rules of Civil Procedure as in other
cases, but there are certain jurisdictional allegations which must
be set forth in the complaint. Your complaint should contain an
allegation not only of the interstate nature of the employer's busi-
ness but also of the facts which establish that the employee is
directly engaged in interstate commerce or in the production
of goods for such commerce. It may be deemed insufficient to
allege merely "that defendant was engaged in interstate com-
merce" or that the employee "worked directly in the production of
goods for commerce." Many of the courts have held that you must
allege more than mere conclusions to establish jurisdiction.1
2
The federal courts have differed as to how much should be set out
in the employee's complaint. Generally, however, they will try to
determine from the evidence on the trial the jurisdictional facts
and from a technical construction of the pleadings. As one
court stated, "Unless it appears with certainty from the com-
plaint that such employees would be entitled to no relief under the
facts stated, the complaint should not be dismissed,' 1 but there
are numerous cases which require specific allegations of the juris-
dictional facts in order to determine coverage of the Act. The
complaint should also contain a statement of the ultimate facts
which show that there existed a contractual relationship be-
ll For examples of joinder. see, Archer v. Musick, 147 Neb. 1018. 25 N.W. 2d 908
(1947) ; Keele v. Union Pac. R. Co., 78 F. Supp. 679 (D.C. Calif. 1949).
",W. S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 78 F. Supp. 616 (D.C. Mo. 1948) ; Baggett v. Henry
Riseher Packing Co., 37 F. Supp. 670 (D.C. Ky. 1941).
22Clyde v. Broderick, 144 Fed. 2d 348 (10th Cir. 1944); De Loach v. Crowley's,
Inc., 128 Fed. 2d 378 (5th Cir. 1942).
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tween your employee and the employer. Should you specify in the
complaint the hours of overtime due and the amount of under-
payment involved? Some courts have required that you plead
the exact months and time worked, holding that a mere allega-
tion that the employee was not paid the overtime provided by the
Act was insufficient. On the other hand, many of the federal courts
have held that it is not necessary to specifically allege the over-
time which may later appear from the evidence. 14 When an em-
ployee was employed by a company engaged in interstate and intra-
state commerce, the court required the complaint to set forth the
amount of time he worked in each classification and, where he
worked for two employers, the amount worked for each. 15 If you
bring a collective action on behalf of your employee and other em-
ployees similarly situated, it would seem advisable to set out
the names of these other employees. Your failure to set forth the
authority of the agent to bring the action for the others may ren-
der the complaint insufficient as to them. You must show on the
face of the complaint that the employees are similarly situated.
In several cases, however, the suit was held not subject to dismis-
sal on the grounds that the complaint did not name the employees
alleged to be similarly situated." In others, the employer was al-
lowed, by appropriate motions, to obtain their names. The judg-
ment will not affect those employees who did not submit to the
court's jurisdiction.
No SPECIAL RULES OF PLEADING REQUIRED
Apart from the question of jurisdiction there are really no
special rules of pleading which are unique in this class of cases.
The facts of each case will govern what you will do. The use of
motions will follow the general rules of practice and procedure.
Motions to dismiss the complaint because of insufficiency have
been denied by the federal courts unless it appeared with certain-
ty that the employee was entitled to no relief under any state
of facts. It it should appear, however, that there is no possible
claim, notwithstanding amendments, the court will dismiss the
proceeding rather than indulge in long and expensive litigation.
Motions to strike will generally be denied as in other cases, and
motions for summary judgment will be denied where the record
discloses any issue of fact which must be determined from evidence
which would be submitted at the trial. In actions involving Por-
talto-Portal activities where the complaint must show that the
claim should be paid under express provisions of a contract or
under a custom or practice in effect when the claim arose, the
" Compare Hunt v. National Linen Service Corp., 178 Tenn. 262, with Dykema v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 11 Labor Cases Sec. 63.414 (D.C. Ill. 1946).
15 Kldd v. Royal Crown Bottling Co., 6 Labor Cases Sec. 61,385 (Tenn. 1942).
16 Compare: Coleman v. Springsely Realty Corp., 6 Labor Cases, Sec. 61,406 (D.C.
N.Y. 1943) ; Calabrese v. Chiumento, 3 F.R.D. 435 (D.C. N.J. 1944) ; Dolan v. Day and
Zimmerman, Inc., 8 Labor Cases Sec. 62,189 (D).C. Mass. 1943).
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failure to allege this will justify a summary judgment or a motion
to dismiss.17 Sometimes an employer will move for security for
costs. The federal courts have generally rejected this motion
where the employees were residents or were employed within
the jurisdiction of the court. In Colorado, the right to such se-
curity would be governed by our general statute on costs.
The liberal use of counter claims and setoffs as provided for
in Rule 13 of our rules is also available to the employer in these
suits. The employer's counter-claim will be allowed even though
it does not arise out of the same facts. It is because of this that,
in one case, the employer was permitted to offset a debt owing to
him but only after liquidated damages for the employee were
computed.' 8
USE OF DISCOVERY AND DEPOSITION ESSENTIAL
A most important procedural device for successful litigation
is obtaining information before trial. Information regarding hours
worked, compensation received, rates of pay, premiums, and other
relevant matters may be secured under our rules for discovery
or depositions. The federal courts have on several occasions stated
that these rules may be employed only after the pleadings have
been formulated. A federal court held that one cannot take the
deposition of his employer for the purpose of discovering evidence
to enable him to frame a complaint. 19 He can do so only after the
action has been commenced. An employee will then have the right
to examine the books and records of the employer. The examina-
tion will be limited to the material records relating to the parties
to the action.20 Motions for inspection and discovery of employer's
books and records will be granted but subject to control by the
court. You may request admissions of fact from the employer,
thereby relieving you from the costs and labor of proving facts
which would not be disputed. Interrogatories have been allowed
where limited to the plaintiffs of record and to the period covered
by the complaint. Often the court will try to avoid the unreason-
able burden upon the employer of requiring him to compile a great
deal of information which may be of doubtful relevancy. It has
been held that discovery must be limited to the period of time
which would not be excluded by the statute of limitations.
What are your rights to a bill of particulars? You may ask
for a bill as a dilatory tactic, but if you really want it, your motion
will be considered in the light of several decisions. It will be denied
if you merely seek evidence; it will be denied if the pleadings
are definite enough to answer. Some of the courts have allowed
it only if necessary to answer but not to prepare for trial. A party
will not be entitled to it when he seeks discovery of matters
17 Hays v. hercules Powder Co., 13 Labor Cases see. 64,123 (ID.C. Mo. 19,47).
18 Barrineau v. Carolina Milling Co., 52 F. Supp. 197 (D.C. S.C. 1942).
1- Ferkauf v Leon Decorating Co., Inc., 3 F.R.D. 89 (D.C. N.Y. 1943).
20Fishman v. Marcouse, 32 F. Supp. 460 (D.C. Pa. 1940).
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which are within his own knowledge. Where employees have filed
a collective suit on behalf of themselves and others, the courts
have often granted bills of particular in order that the claim of
each employee might be definitely set forth, together with the
jurisdictional facts involved.21 Where several plaintiffs are in-
volved, it might facilitate a speedy and inexpensive determination
of the individual claims. They have thus required the employee
on occasions to furnish a bill which would separate the claims of
each, as it were, and furnish the names of the employees, the exact
work done, the period of time involved, etc. Where exemption is
pleaded by the employer as a separate defense, a bill of particu-
lars has been ordered, and where the employer asserted as a de-
fense that he had relied in good faith on an administrative regu-
lation, the employee was entitled to a bill of particulars setting
forth this regulation and the employer's acts in reliance on it.
You will not be allowed to procure information secured by
the Wage and Hour Division, for this is privileged. There will
be other confidential government records unavailable to you but
the discovery procedure available in both the federal and state
courts permits application to the court for a subpoena directing the
appearance and production of records or evidence when material
to the suit. Such subpoena will be enforceable by contempt pro-
ceedings where there is a violation.
THE BURDEN OF PROOF AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
The employee has the burden of proving by a preponderance
of evidence that he is entitled to recover. He must prove all the
essential elements of his claim. He has the burden of showing the
existence of the employer-employee relationship; that his activities
are within the coverage of the Act; that the employer has violated
the provisions of the Act to his damage. If he was engaged in
both interstate and intrastate commerce, he has the burden of
showing how much time he was employed in interstate com-
merce. He cannot claim violations of the Act based upon guess
work or speculation. His evidence must not be uncertain or con-
jectural. He cannot indicate in a general way how much overtime
work he performed. The court should not place upon an employee
a standard of proof which is so great as to be unrealistic. It is
held that his claim need not rest upon documentary evidence. In
other cases, where the employer has failed to keep records of his
employees and their hours and wages which the law requires. the
burden of proof will not shift to the employer, but the employee
will be allowed to show the amount and extent of his work as a
matter of reasonable inference..2 2 In many cases the employee
" Dolan v. Dan & Zimmerman, 8 Labor Cases, Sec. 62,189 (D.C. Mass. 1943):
Lemme v. V. La Rosa & Sons, 7 F.R.I). 485 (D.C.N.Y. 1947) ; Compare-Dykema v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 8 F.R.I). 230 (D.C. Ill. 1947).
22 Electron Corp. v. Wilkins, 14 Labor Cases, Sec. 64,234 (Colo. 1947); Davies v.
Onyx Oils and Resins, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 777 (D.C. N.J. 1946).
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tried to prove his case by self-kept records. These were usually
held not to sustain his burden of proof especially where they were
not kept daily and their accuracy and truthfulness were suspect.
There are no special rules concerning admission of evidence
which apply to employee suits. You should remember that the
rules applied in Colorado will be followed in the federal court for
Colorado. You might consider the decision of a few cases in this
field: self-serving declarations of an employee who kept a daily
record of his hours worked in order to make a claim against his
employer were held inadmissible; an employer cannot vary his
written contract by offering parol evidence to prove that lower
rates were agreed upon; but admissions against interest have been
held admissible. These admissions were interesting-an offer by
the employer to pay if the employee would drop his suit and give
a written release of all claims under the Act. The courts have ap-
plied the best evidence rule where the employer had failed to keep
records and the employee presented the best evidence which was
available.
You will get a feeling of what degree of proof is sufficient
to establish the employee's claim by reading the cases involved.
Time-clock records are important where they accurately reflect
the period worked, but they are never conclusive. The employer
may not establish an exclusive way of determining the hours
worked. Where employer kept no records and employee testified
positively of hours worked, which were not contradicted, such tes-
timony was held sufficient to entitle him to a judgment.2 3 Any
records of an employee which appear fabricated or which were
entered for the purpose of instituting a claim and were not made
currently, will be rejected. In some cases, disinterested witnesses
testified to corroborate the plaintiff's testimony, and a sufficient
showing was made. Mere general recollection by an employee of
this time worked, without more, was held insufficient. It has been
held that an employee need not prove with exact precision the
amount of overtime hours he worked. Where it was undisputed
that other employees were similarly situated with the plaintiff, a
recovery was warranted for them, even though they did not all
appear personally and testify.
24
Ji RY TRIAL, VERDICT AND APPEAL
You will probably want a jury. You will be entitled to a trial
by jury whether in federal court or in the state court. Your
demand should be in writing and within the period required by
our Rules of Civil Procedure. There are no special rules in an
"Campbell v. Mandel Auto Parts, 6 Labor Cases Sec. 61,557 (S.Y. 1943) ; On the
question of sufficiency, see: Lawley & Sons v. South, 140 Fed. 2d 439 (1st. Cir. 1944) ;
Murdick v. Cities Service Oil Co., 9 Labor Cases Sec. 62,389 (10th Cir. 1949) ; Richard-
son v. Duff, 194 S.W. 2d 389 (Ky. 1946).




employee suit concerning a jury trial, which differ from other
suits. The courts have said that the trial judge may not direct a
verdict where reasonable men draw different inferences from the
evidence. A jury's verdict supported by substantial evidence will
not be set aside. In one case it was set aside when the judgment
for the plaintiff was less than was warranted from the undisputed
evidence. It will be set aside where it is inconsistent or against the
weight of the evidence or based on a compromise or not responsive
to any finding of fact. Appeals from judgment in employees'
suits do not differ from other cases. A trial court's finding of facts,
where sufficient to sustain the judgment, will be binding upon the
appellate court unless clearly erroneous.
THE EMPLOYER'S DEFENSES
Now let us consider the employer. How shall he defend the
employee suit? He will not be liable if he can show that the em-
ployee was not an employee, or that he was not covered by the Act,
or that he was not employed at a wage below the legal minimum
or in excess of 40 hours a week. You should very carefully con-
sider the 1949 amendments to the Act on the question of coverage
or exemption. Many employees are now excluded from the Act
as the exemptions have been enlarged to a considerable extent-
they will include many retail and service establishments, laundries
and dry-cleaners, telephone and telegraph agencies, news boys,
employees of local newspapers, or taxicab operators and others.
Many of the exemptions will be administrative, and you must
search carefully to find them.
Considerable litigation has already indicated what other types
of defenses will be sustained or denied. If you justify the em-
ployer's conduct by a state law or some other federal law, or if
you offer an agreement or contract, all of which is contrary to the
Act or prohibited by it, your defense will not be sustained. There-
fore, employment contracts which provide that the parties shall
arbitrate wage disputes form a vilid defense.2 5 The employer
can not show that he offered a payment to the employee which
was accepted where the amount was not in accordance with the Act
or where he tendered overtime payment after it was due. In many
cases the employer has pleaded estoppel, e.g., that the employee
has consistently accepted less wages without protest, that he has
failed to make a demand for overtime wages, or that he has sub-
mitted false records. None of these defenses are sufficient to
avoid liability under the act.2 6 If you claim payment as a defense,
it must be for the full amount required. A prior judgment or a
dismissal with prejudice in a former action involving the same
25 St. Clair v. Russell and Pugh Lumber Co., 51 F. Supp. 47 (D.C. Idaho 1943).
26Block v. Bell, 53 F. Supp. 863 (D.C. Ky. 1945); Lawley & Sons v. South, 140
Fed. 2d 439 (1st Cir. 1944) ; Travis v. Ray, 41 F. Supp. 6 (D.C. Ky. 1941) ; Freeman
v. Blake Co., 84 F. Supp. 700 (D.C. Mass. 1949).
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parties and the same claim will, however, bar recovery in the later.
suit. If such a prior action is still pending, the later action should
be abated.
There are some very significant defenses which you must care-
fully consider. If you can show that your employer acted in good
faith in relying upon an administrative ruling which was in effect
and that he conformed to it innocently, this may constitute a bar
to an action for violations even though the administrative ruling
was later changed or rescinded. The Portal-to-Portal Act, which
supplements the FLSA, created this defense in order to protect
employers from the retroactive effects of changes brought about
by new administrative rulings or court decisions. The Portal-to-
Portal Act makes a distinction between the past acts or omissions
of the employer resulting from his reliance upon administrative
rulings which occurred prior to May 14, 1947 and those which
occurred subsequently. If the employer's acts or omissions were
prior to that date, the ruling upon which he relied as a defense
does not have to be in writing, and it may be any administrative
ruling of any federal agency. Those subsequent to May 14, 1947
must, however, be a written ruling or enforcement policy of the
Wage and Hour Administrator.
GOOD FAITH RELIANCE ON RULINGS
In such a case certain problems obviously arise. Is the ruling
or policy in fact that of the Wage and Hour Administration? Is
it an official ruling or a policy? If the Administrator fails to reply
to the employer to an inquiry, is this an administrative ruling?
If he abandons a court action or an appeal, must the Administrator
affirmatively act? Is the ruling applicable to the particular busi-
ness in which the employer is engaged? It has also been held that
before the employer's good faith reliance upon an administrative
practice is to relieve him from violations, such practice or policy
must be based upon the ground that the act did not violate the
FLSA and that the practice or policy of the Administrator in not
enforcing the Act with respect to the employer's acts or omissions
induced him to believe that he was not violating the Act. The em-
ployer must actually rely upon the administrative ruling or policy
and conform to it. There must be truly good faith. What consti-
tutes good faith on the part of the employer and whether he was
justified in believing that he was not violating the Act must be
determined by the particular circumstances of each case. 27 You
should carefully study the interpretive bulletins and court de-
cisions in considering this defense.
The employer's good faith is also important on the question
,7 For the test of good faith, see: Kam Koon Wan v. E. E. Block, Ltd., 14 Labor




of liquidated damages. The Act provides that an employee may
recover as liquidated damages an additional amount equal to the
unpaid compensation. At first an award of liquidated damages
was held mandatory upon the courts. Section II of the Portal-to-
Portal Act gave to the courts discretionary power to award or
withhold liquidated damages in these cases. This depends upon
the employer showing to the satisfaction of the court that he was
innocent and that his conduct was in good faith and was based
upon reasonable grounds for believing that he did not violate
the Act. This is obviously a question of fact which can only be
determined upon trial. The employee's claim for liquidated dam-
ages cannot be summarily overruled. Good faith should be pleaded
by the employer. You should also know that the employee cannot
recover interest on an award for liquidated damages.
An additional significant defense should here be mentioned.
It involves the statute of limitations. It is sufficient to state now
that the federal statute of limitations will govern all causes of ac-
tions and supercede our Colorado statute of limitations in these
employee suits. There is a two year statute of limitations for suits
under the FLSA as amended, and all causes of action arising prior
to January 5, 1950, the effective date of the 1949 amendment,
would be barred by the end of two years after that date. A cause
of action, for unpaid wages, accrues when the wages become due
and are not paid: There need be no demand for payment. The
employee's action is commenced on the date when the complaint
is filed with the court. In the case of a collective action or one
brought by an employee to enforce his rights and those of others
similarly situated, the action is not considered to begin for these
other employees until they have filed a written consent with
the court or have otherwise participated actively. This is in ac-
cordance with the Portal Act.
EMPLOYEE CLAIMS CANNOT BE COMPROMISED
If the employee has been paid in full under supervision of
the Wage and Hour Administration and has accepted such pay-
ment, this is a waiver of his rights for the benefits provided by the
Act. There is a similar waiver to the employee's right to liquidated
damages and attorney fees if he authorizes and consents to an
Administrator suit, but you will be confronted with a very signi-
ficant problem. Can you settle the employee's claim out of court
and obtain releases which will be valid? Our supreme court has
held that the Wage and Hour law confers statutory rights which
are affected with a public interest and, therefore, these rights can-
not be waived or released. In a series of decisions the court held
that the employee cannot waive or release or compromise his rights
to minimum wages or overtime pay or liquidated damages. He
cannot accept less than the full amount due him under the Act.
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He cannot release his claim for liquidated damages (prior to the
amendments of the Act). He cannot relinquish his claim to liqui-
dated damages by accepting full payment for overtime work where
the dispute involves coverage under the Act.2 8 Lower courts have
been in conflict as to the validity of compromised agreements
where there is a bona fide dispute as to the number of hours
worked by the employee. It is, therefore, very dangerous to com-
promise a employee's claim under the Act. There is, however, a
device which is available and which should accomplish this pur-
pose. Where a compromise agreement which is fair and equitable
has been merged in a judgment, when the parties appear before
the court and seek a consent decree, such a judgment would then
appear to be a bar to a later action.2 9 Should it be inequitable or
fraudulent, the solution would be a motion to set aside this judg-
ment which otherwise will remain in force.
INTERSTATE BAR COUNCIL MEETS IN DENVER
The Colorado Bar Association will be host this year to the
bar representatives of the eleven Western states which make up
the Interstate Bar Council. This council has for its purpose the
promotion and exchange of ideas on programs relating to the
welfare and improvement of the legal profession in this area.
The council will stage its annual meeting at the Brown Palace
in Denver on February 28, the day following the close of the mid-
winter meeting of the ABA House of Delegates in Chicago. Presi-
dent Edward G. Knowles will welcome the delegates in behalf of
the Colorado Bar Association and participate in the panel discus-
sion on bar association matters which will be presided over by
Harry J. McClean of the Los Angeles bar, chairman of the council.
President Fritz A. Nagel has arranged to accelerate the regu-
lar March meeting of the Denver Bar Association in order that
it may coincide with this occasion. A joint luncheon will be held
at the University Club in honor of the visitors from Arizona,
California, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah,
Washington and Wyoming. This promises to be one of the out-
standing programs of the year, and further notice as to the
speaker, subject and other arrangements will be given later.
Interested bar association members are also invited to drop
into the Tabor-Stratton Room of the Brown Palace at 10:00 a.m.
and 2 p.m. on Wednesday, February 28 to hear a lively panel dis-
cussion on the following subjects:
"Observe the decisions of the Supreme Court as they have developed: Brooklyn
Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697 (1944) ; Dize v. Maddrix, 324 U.S . (1945)
Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108 (1946).
2Bracey v. Luray, 161 Fed. 2d 128 (4th Cir. 1947).
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a. Between state bar associations and local bar groups
b. Between state bar association and other professional
groups
(1) at state level
(2) at local level
c. The bar and the public (Tentative arrangements have
been made with several outstanding local laymen to be
present and participate in the discussion.)
2. Legal education
a. Regional bar examinations (discussion led by Eugene
Glenn, Chairman of the National Conference of Bar
Examiners)
b. California survey of legal education
3. Post admission education of the bar
Extension service of state university (discussion led by
Harold F. Furst, Director of Extension Service of the
University of California)
b. Law institutes
(1) during bar conventions
(2) sponsored by local bars
(3) sponsored by law schools
4. Regional conferences of the American Bar Association
(discussion led by Burt J. Thompson, Chairman of the Com-
mittee on Regional Conferences of the American Bar
Association)
5. Re-orientation of thinking of leaders of the bar
a. Historical concepts
b. Present trends
c. Challenge to the bar today
6. Re-activation of the potential leadership of the bar.
MEMBERS RECALLED TO SERVICE
The following additional members of the Denver and Colorado
bar associations are reported to have been recalled to service in
the armed forces:
Robert S. Davies, Robert P. Davison, David V. Dunklee, Rob-
ert C. Hawley, Claude M. Maer, Thomas M. Sullivan, and Harold
M. Webster.
On January 1, 1951, the firm of Shuteran, Robinson and Har-
rington in the Equitable Bldg., Denver, announced that Richard
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BILL PROPOSED TO REVISE COLORADO STATUTES
The Statutes Publications committee, under the chairmanship
of Allyn Cole of Glenwood Springs, recently completed the draft
of a bill which would establish a permanent state office of a revisor
of statutes under a statutory revision commission. The commission
and its staff would be charged with preparing a completely new
and much-needed revision of the Colorado statutes, with annota-
tions thereto, for presentation to the 1953 General Assembly.
Thereafter, it would be function of the revisor to keep the stat-
utes in a current condition, as well as assist in bill drafting serv-
ice for the legislature.
The proposed bill has been approved by the Board of Gover-
nors of the Colorado Bar Association and presented for the con-
sideration of the General Assembly. Attorneys and others who
are interested in having a useable and up-to-date revision of the
statutes should recommend the measure to their representatives.
The full text of the bill reads as follows:
A BILL FOR
AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE REVISION AND CODIFICATION OF
THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF COLORADO; TO ESTABLISH A COMMIS-
SION FOR STATUTE REVISION AND PROVIDING FOR THE OFFICE OF
REVISOR OF STATUTES AND PRESCRIBING THE DUTIES THEREOF:
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Colorado:
SECTION 1. There is hereby established a Commission on Statute Revision
to consist of the Chief Justice of Colorado or a Justice of the Supreme Court to
be designated by the Chief Justice; the Attorney General of Colorado; two (2)
members of the Senate to be appointed by the President of the Senate; two (2)
members of the House of Representatives to be appointed by the Speaker of the
House; provided that not more than one of the members of said Commission
appointed as aforesaid from each of the houses of the General Assembly shall
be affiliated with the same political party. The members of the Commission shall
serve without compensation as such but shall receive their actual and necessary
expenses incurred in the performance of their official duties.
SECTION 2. The Chief Justice or Justice of the Supreme Court designated
by the Chief Justice, shall be chairman of the Commission and shall call meet-
ings of the Commission at such times as shall be necessary for the proper per-
formance of the duties and requirements of this act.
SECTION 3. Immediaely upon its organization, the Commission shall ap-
point a Revisor of Statutes and such associates and assistants as it shall deem
necessary, and shall fix the compensation thereof. The Revisor of Statutes and
his associates and assistants shall be attorneys at law, serving as such, and
shall serve at the pleasure of the Commission. The Commission may also auth-
orize the employment of such clerical and stenographic assistance as may be
necessary to effect the requirements of this act. Such clerical and stenographic
assistance shall be requisitioned from the civil service list and will be subject
to civil service regulations.
SECTION 4. Immediately upon his appointment the Revisor of Statutes,
under the supervision and direction of the Commission, shall proceed to compile,
edit, arrange and prepare for publication the Declaration of Independence, the
Constitutions of the United States and of the State of Colorado, the act admit-
ting Colorado into the Union and all laws of the State of Colorado of a general
and permanent nature in effect on July 1, 1952, together with a complete index
thereto and comparative stables of such statutes with prior compilations. The
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statutory laws shall be arranged into titles, chapters, articles and sections so
collated and arranged with appropriate section or paragraph numbers in such
form as the Commission shall approve and direct. At the end of each section,
reference shall be made to the statutory history of such section. Annotations
of decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, the Supreme Court of
Colorado and the Federal Courts, construing, applying or interpreting each
section, or relating to the subject matter thereof, and such other matter as the
Commission shall deem advisable or advantageous shall also be prepared for
publication in such form as the Commission shall direct.
SECTION 5. In the course of collating, compiling, editing and preparing
said statutes, the Revisor of Statutes, under the supervision and direction of
the Commission, shall adopt a uniform system of punctuation, capitalization
and wording; eliminate all obsolete and redundant words, correct obvious errors
and inconsistencies, eliminate duplications and laws repealed directly or by
implication; correct defective section structure in arrangement of the subject
matter of existing statutes; clarify existing laws and such other similar matter
as the Commission shall deem proper. All of the foregoing shall be done in
such form and manner as to preserve the intent, effect and meaning of any and
every such statutory provision.
SECTION 6. The Commission shall prepare a report of said statutes so
compiled, edited and annotated and shall admit such report to the 1953 session
of the General Assembly. The report of the Commission shall contain printing
and binding specifications for the printing and binding of the 1953 Revised
Statutes of Colorado, and annotations thereof, in such form that bids for the
publication thereof may be invited. Such specifications shall provide that the
copyright of said 1953 Revised Statutes of Colorado, and annotations thereof,
shall be taken and remain in the Secretary of State for the State of Colorado.
Such report shall also contain recommendations to the General Assembly of
such legislation as is deemed necessary, if any, for repeal or amendment of
existing laws, which may be obsolete, inoperative, imperfect, obscure, or in
doubt, to the end that clarification and certainty may be improved.
SECTION 7. Immediately following the 1953 session of the General Assembly,
the Commission shall prepare the laws passed at such session in the manner
provided in Sections 4 and 6 of this act, so that they may be included in the
publication of the 1953 Revised Statutes of Colorado.
SECTION 8. The Revisor of Statutes shall, at the end of each legislative
session after 1953, annotate, arrange and prepare for publication in the form
of pocket parts or bound supplements to said revision, all general laws enacted
during such session and said supplements, when certified by the Commission,
published and copyrighted as aforesaid, shall be received, recognized and re-
ferred to in like manner and with like effect as the original revision.
SECTION 9. The Revisor of Statutes, together with so many of his per-
manent staff as may be necessary, shall aid and assist the Legislative Reference
Bureau or other agency of the General Assembly in bill drafting service, and
in enrolling and engrossing bills and such other services as the legislature may
require.
SECTION 10. The distribution of the 1953 Revised Statutes of Colorado,
and annotations thereof, shall be in such numbers and to such offices and per-
cons as the General Assembly shall direct at the time of approval for publica-
tion of such revised statutes.
SECTION 11. The General Assembly hereby finds, determines and declares
this act to be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace,
health and safety.
THE BOOK TRADER'S CORNER
W. A. E. Mitchell, Coronado Building, in Greeley, has a com-
plete set of U.S.C.A. (up to date of 11-1-50) for sale at $200.00.
FOR SALE
RECORDING AND DICTATING EQUIPMENT
1 used Ediphone transcriber, cylinder type ---------- $ 50.00
1 used Dictaphone dictator, cylinder type ...................... $ 30.00
1 new Dictaphone dictator, cylinder electronic ----------..... $275.00
Call TAbor 8181, Extension 61
ARNEILL CLINIC
W. L. LOCKWOOD, Business Manager
COLORADO ACCIDENT
LAW DIGEST
610 Colorado Accident Cases Digested
and Classified According to
Fact Situations
Send check for purchase price of $11.50 (incl. tax) to
RICHARD D. HALL
604 Equitable Bldg. Denver 2, Colo.
74 COLORADO LIBRARY
For MAXIMUM SERVICE at MINIMUM COST
Includes:
American Jurisprudence
American Law Reports and A.L.R. 2d Series
A.L.R. Permanent Digest
U. S. Supreme Court Reports, L. Ed.
New U. S. Supreme Court Digest Annotated
Federal Code Annotated
Hillyers Annotated Forms of Pleading & Practice
Nichols Cyclopedia of Legal Forms
Available on Liberal Terms from
BANCROFT-WHITNEY COMPANY
Law Book Publishers Since 1856
200 McALLISTER STREET - SAN FRANCISCO 1, CALIFORNIA
Dicta Advertisers Merit Your Patronage
